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Abstract Drawing on our own art/science practices and a
series of interviews with artificial life practitioners, we explore the
entanglement of developments at the artistic edges of artificial life.
We start by defining key terms from Karen Baradʼs agential realism.
We then diffractively read artificial life together with agential realism
to discuss the potential for interventions in the field. Through a
discussion of artificial life computer simulations, ideas of agency
are problematized, and artificial lifeʼs single purposeful actor, the
agent, is replaced by agential, an adjective denoting a relationship rather
than a subject-object duality. We then seek to reinterpret the
difficult-to-define term “emergence.” Agency in artificial life emerges
through what Barad calls entanglement, in this case between observers
and their apparatus, a perpetual engagement between observations
of a system and their interpretations. The article explores the
differences that this diffractive perspective makes to artificial life
and accounts of its materialization.
1 Introduction
In this article we reframe artificial life (ALife) and explore ideas connected to computational life forms,
drawing on a series of interviews with biologists and computer scientists. Referring to the philosophies
of Karen Barad [2], we argue that there is a need for a new ontology—one that positions ALife as a
“lively process.” Continuing Helen Pritchardʼs research on the overlapping or fusing of computational
and nonhuman animal bodies [28], we explore the entanglement of developments at the artistic edges of
ALife. Our correspondents include the computer scientist and roboticist Steve Grand. His Grandroids
[14, 15] (virtual creatures [16]) are constructed from models of complex networks of virtual brain cells,
biochemical reactions, and genes. We also interviewed the stem cell researcher and liver pathologist Neil
Theise. Lastly, we interviewed the simulation expert and member of the TechnoSphere [30] team, Mark
Hurry. TechnoSphere, originally made with Gordon Selley in the 1990s, was a simple ALife environ-
ment populated by creatures, many of which were designed via a Web interface by online users, with
others created automatically by the system to increase the initial population. TechnoSphere is now being
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redeveloped as a mobile ALife application making use of GPS, augmented reality, and 3D printing, in
response to contemporary debates and technologies that suggest and enable new ways of working with
material and embodiment. In the new TechnoSphere, simulated creatures enter the physical world in 3D
form, and the environment the human inhabits affects the ALife system and the creatures, with users
and creatures becoming blended.
We discuss the use of ALife computer simulation as apparatus by artists working with scientists in
projects likeTechnoSphere, to suggest that artists using existing scientific apparatus produce and participate
in intra-actions through which understanding or knowledge emerges. Both TechnoSphere and Grandroids
might be described as profound material-discursive reconfigurations of bodies and processes.
2 Material Practices of ALife Art: A Timeless Story?
Much discussion surrounding ALife in the 1980s and 1990s focused on ways in which technical
artifice can produce life or “lifelike behaviour” [37]. This emphasis led to an understanding of ALife
as a human-designed process that described the autonomous animation of inanimate material
through formal models inspired by natural phenomena. The weak conception of ALife as “compu-
tationally based models of natural biological systems” [24] is built around a human protagonist (pro-
grammer) breathing life into technical artifice, writing a lifelike program that potentially exceeds the
programmerʼs rules by displaying emergent behavior, which is discussed later. The key to this def-
inition of weak ALife is the use of the term “model.” Claims for strong ALife suggest it is possible
not only to model but to create life, using other media such as mechanical automata, chemical life, or
the computational medium of a computer. The associated idea that life is a medium-independent
phenomenon [24, 7] has been challenged [27] by comparisons with one cybernetic concept of the
mind that views cognition as embodied and embedded, both ecologically and socially [5]. This de-
bate has led to a revision of the definition of strong ALife that focuses on the usefulness of seeing
life as dynamic processes intra-acting with their environment, rather than seeing a specific material
that constitutes “aliveness.” While noting these weak and strong positions with regard to ALife, we
are not subscribing to the belief that ALife is computationally based, nor that computation lies at its
core. By contrast, central to our thesis is the argument that at no point can any tool (computer or
otherwise) be considered neutral in the production of ALife, which we consider to be an embodied
and situated practice. As we have learnt from ALife studies of emergent behavior [7], there is more
to ALife than what is breathed into it by a human designer. Emergent behavior accounts for the
agency of ALife systems, and emphasizes that ALife is more than the enactment of a textual instruc-
tion, such as source code, on matter. It has long been understood in ALife practices that the activity
of reading source code representations of ALife will not necessarily result in a clear understanding of
the behavior of an ALife system [23].
ALife has repeatedly reconfigured our practices and caused us to reconsider the boundaries of the
living and the artificial [34, 31]. However, despite their openness to engaging with the systems we design
[1], ALife theories have remained bound to ontologies that privilege the opposition of life and artifice,
inanimate and animate material, nature and culture. In this article we go beyond the idea of ALife as a
solely human pursuit to argue that ALife materializes through the properties of nonhuman elements such
as the hardware and software employed, through the discourse that surround these and the practices of
their application. We suggest that ALife is not the practice of “breathing life” into inanimate matter, but
an entangled and co-constituted process emerging from the material discourse of ALife itself.
We now define key terms from Baradʼs framework relevant to this article, specifically “agential
realism,” “intra-action,” “entanglement,” and “diffraction.” We later relate them to ALife.
3 Summarized Definitions of Key Terms
Agential realism is a theory proposed by Barad using analogies from quantum physics to re-conceptualize
the practices and processes through which scientific objects and knowledge are created. Agential realism
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rethinks agency within scientific practices [2], demanding that we understand how the apparatus of
science (for instance, ALife models or simulations) are formed through practices, for example, looking
through a microscope to observe the chemical process through which a cell is formed. “According to
agential realism, knowing, thinking, measuring, theorizing, and observing are subjective material practices
of intra-acting within and as part of the world” [2, p. 90]. Barad uses the term “agential” or “agentially
enacted” in place of “agency,” to connote the complexity and contingency of an agency that emerges
from the interplay of relations between loosely bounded entities. The new sense of causality suggested by
Barad is not the simple combination of classical options often presented in the humanities-and-science
debate, that “on the one hand there is absolute freedom in our choices of apparatus, and, on the other
strict deterministic causal relationships” [2, p. 130]. Instead, agential realism proposes a positive conver-
sation between the disciplines and is a useful framework for considering ALife agents that at once seem
to have boundaries and yet are acknowledged to be an intrinsic part of a wider environment.
Interaction and intra-action. The term “interaction” is common in discussions of multi-agent systems
(MASs), agent-based systems (ABSs) [39], and ALife. In those contexts, interaction assumes that
there are separate individual agencies, or agents, and that such separation between entities precedes
their interaction. Intra-action works as a counterpoint to the model of interaction, signifying the
materialization of agencies conventionally called “subjects” and “objects,” “bodies” and “environ-
ment,” through relationships. Intra-action assumes that distinct bounded agencies do not precede
this relating but that they emerge through it.
Entanglement is a key part of Baradʼs agential realism that works on a number of levels. Barad
suggests that different entities interweave and entangle, in an ongoing process of intra-action, result-
ing in the production of new entities that, in turn, entangle with others. Entanglements are distinct
from a blended mass. “Entanglement does not mean that what are entangled cannot be differenti-
ated, discussed or remedied, only that the different entangled strands cannot be adequately dealt
with in isolation, as if they were unrelated to the others” [18, p. 43]. An intra-active understanding
of entanglement also demands that individual strands are not to be understood as self-subsistent
entities, but as continuously and co-constitutionally refigured in, and through, their mutual interde-
pendence [18]. Barad uses entanglement to discuss all scales of relationality from the entanglements
of ontology and epistemology to those of observed and observer.
Diffraction. We conduct a diffractive reading of ALife practice and Baradʼs agential realism [2] in order
to move beyond thinking of the disciplinary domains of science, theory, and art as separate, and
rather to see them as entangled, that is, retaining difference, variation, and heterogeneity. Donna
Haraway [19] suggests that the metaphor of diffractions can be a useful counterpoint to reflection.
Both are optical phenomena, but whereas reflection creates a mirror image, or a copy, diffraction
attends to patterns of difference. As Lynne Keevers and Lesley Treleaven explain, “diffraction pro-
duces the spectacular colours and rings sometimes seen around the moon. These rings cannot be
attributed to the moon or the clouds but are produced through the intra-action of the moon and the
clouds” [21, p. 509]. We find the optical metaphor of diffraction is productive for re-thinking the
entities, agencies and events that emerge from ALife art practice. It is noteworthy that diffractive
methodologies build on feminist theories of situated perspectives [20, 19, 35]. In diffractive approaches
“the point is not simply to put the observer or knower back in the world (as if the world were a
container and we merely needed to acknowledge our situatedness in it)” [2, p. 91], but to see no
separation between subject and object, which are instead entangled in phenomena. Diffractive method-
ologies are not objective, and do not offer an undistorted mirror image of the world; rather they are
methods of accountability and responsibility to the entanglements of which we are a part [2].
4 The Observer and the Observational Cut
In 1973 the Chilean biologist Humberto Maturana, working with his student Francisco Varela,
brought together the concepts of homeostasis and systems thinking to describe what they termed
“autopoiesis” [38]. They defined such living systems as self-producing mechanisms that maintain
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their particular form, despite material inflow and outflow, through self-regulation and self-reference
[25]. Importantly for Maturana and Varela, the observer was “a living system and any understanding
of cognition as a biological phenomenon must account for the observer and his role in it” [25,
p. 48]. The observer, they explained, “can only subdivide a system in parts that he defines through
his interactions, and which, necessarily, lie exclusively in his cognition domain and are operationally
determined by his mode of analysis. Furthermore, the relations through which the observer claims
that these parts constitute a unitary system are relations that arise only through him by his simul-
taneous interactions with the parts and the intact system, and, hence, belong exclusively to his cog-
nitive domain” [25, p. 48]. The human observer is therefore inextricably entangled with the system
she observes. The authors go further, highlighting the importance of the observerʼs use of instru-
ments in the descriptions of any system being observed, and we address this in detail later.
ALifers have been forced to “confront the difficulties posed by having multiple observers em-
bedded within this world whose measurements are necessarily local and relative to each other and
whose interactions can potentially alter its dynamic course” ([10, 25, 33], as cited in [6, p. 16]). In
ABSs it has been ascertained that it is not simply that the observer will cause what is observed,
measured, and described to emerge differently, but that these observations, measurements, and de-
scriptions are also defined by the order of the events that define the reality of what is measured: “the
history (or order of events) measured by each observer creates the reality that this observer perceives
as the evolution of the system” [6, p. 17]. This is what Barad might describe as a process of space-
time-mattering (“existence is not simply a manifold of being that evolves in space and time”); rather,
agencies materialize through iterative intra-action [2, p. 234]. It might be said that in ALife software
that exhibits behaviors characteristic of natural living systems, nothing is inherently separate from
anything else. Barad introduces the term agential cut [3] to draw attention to temporary separations.
Her term attempts to capture the understanding that any act of observation makes a cut between
what is included and what is excluded from observation or consideration. Baradʼs agential cut in-
cludes what we describe as an observational cut. We have found Baradʼs agential realism highly relevant
to ALife as discussed by Maturana and Varela. In the following quotation, taken from their list of the
epistemological and ontological implications of the observer, they use italics to highlight the differ-
ence between reality and descriptions of it, drawing attention to the importance of the use of in-
struments in the act of observing, measuring, and describing: “[t]he observer generates a spoken
description of his cognitive domain (which includes his interactions with and through instruments).
Whatever description he makes, however, that description corresponds to a set of permitted states of
relative activity in his nervous system embodying the relations given in his interactions” [26, p. 39].
Using our experience of developing CELL, an agent-based simulation [29], we now look closely
at the relationship between processes and practices that constitute the ALife simulation of stem cells
in light of the ideas of Barad, Maturana, and Varela. This development of ALife software based on
natural biological systems, like many objects of science, results from numerous observational cuts.
Prophet visited the stem cell researcher Neil Theise to better understand the laboratory practices
used to test his hypothesis that stem cells in the adult body were more plastic than had previously
been thought [9]. Looking back at that experience, and associated conversations with the CELL
team member and mathematician Mark dʼInverno, about their various methods and practices, we
suggest that this collaborative interdisciplinary work included a series of observational cuts, each of
which affected the resulting ALife simulation. Those practices included cell biologyʼs experimental
protocols and material arrangements, which can appear to be reductionist. As Maturana and Varela
might say, Theiseʼs cognition domain was operationally determined by his mode of analysis. For
example, Theise tested the plasticity of stem cell behavior by looking at cross-gendered therapeutic
transplants, specifically, tissue from women who had received male bone marrow transplants and
tissue from men who had received female donor organs. Theise also took stem cells from living 3D
dynamic organisms such as mice with transgene expression of GFP in all their cells. The mice were
sacrificed at various stages of maturity to look for changes in cell plasticity as the cell lines in the
mouse reproduced. Prophet found the necessary act of sacrificing the mice surprising in that it
immediately stopped the dynamic activity of cell behavior that was changing over time, the very
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process that was under scrutiny; but for Theise, studying nonliving tissue to understand the behavior
of living cells was accepted as a necessity, as there was no method for observing the cells in situ in a
living mouse body. The process of observation was via human interactions with instruments that
enabled the stem cells to be observed and described (we use Maturana and Varelaʼs italics here). The
first observational cut, the moment the organism died, was somewhat arbitrary, the result being as
much about all the moments in time that were not chosen as about the moment chosen. The dead
organism, temporarily and temporally “frozen,” was nevertheless three-dimensional and whole. The
second observational cut was the selection of areas of the mouse body to biopsy and the discarding
of the rest. The third observational cut, also a physical cutting, reduced the tissue sample to two
dimensions. Very thin tissue slices, necessary for close observation on slides under the microscope,
were produced from these biopsies, another observational cut that left out more tissue than it re-
tained. The final cut was the material interference of staining, which transformed the tissue slices,
introducing artificial color to highlight some areas and obfuscate others. Theise became acutely
aware of these acts of translation:
The possibility for making a minute change [to a biological system] through the processes
of observation and interaction are always present, and potentially change the nature of the
systemʼs self-organisation. (Neil Theise, pers. comm.)
To describe Theise and Prophetʼs differing methods is not meant to perpetuate the idea that “[i]f
molecular biology is mainly reductionist in approach, one of the suggested promises of Alife research
is, that by allowing for emergence of lifelike processes in the computer and ultimately for ‘synthe-
sising life’, Alife is a way to overcome the gap between holism and reductionism in theoretical
biology” [11, p. 96]. The problem with any simple polarizing of molecular biology and ALife is
exemplified in CELL, where the ALife is built upon data from the research of molecular biologists.
Instead of polarization, we suggest that the reflexive, situated, and embodied use of vision instru-
ments like tissue slicing machines, stains, slides, and microscopes enlarges the cognitive domain of
the observer. Indeed, Theiseʼs reflection on the collaboration includes:
I have not adopted a new methodology in terms of what is on my lab bench […] but the
way I conceptualise stuff set intellectual processes in motion that have not been played out. I
do not ask the same questions that I used to ask. I create hypotheses that are different than I
would have. I see things that other people in my position donʼt. (Neil Theise, pers. comm.)
Observational cuts are part of developing ALife software, especially that which is based on natural
biological systems. Such software is both a description, based on observations, and a system. To
write the CELL software we gathered together numerous descriptions in the form of medical
and biological data, represented in research articles that were written after researchers had gone
through the sorts of processes described above. Key discourses are part of all these practices,
and we cannot ignore the discourse of scientific publishing that led to the broader collection of
articles available to us. The next series of observational cuts occurred in relation to which articles
we studied (only those written in English) and what parts were taken from those articles. From this
collection of data we wrote a plain English model, a description of what we knew about how cells
behave, which lead to a ‘Formal’ model, or set of rules. Even if the English model (description)
were able to gather together all known medical and biological research data about how stem cells
behave in the adult human body, the resulting formal model would remain full of gaps, lacking fine
detail. This is because while more and more is known about natural biological systems, such as stem
cells in the adult human body, there remains a huge amount that we do not understand. These
models led to the rules embedded in subsequent computer code and algorithms that formed the
ALife engine for CELL. In summary, all these practices and processes in laboratories and computing
departments were necessary to develop the apparatus of CELLʼs ALife software. As we produced
the apparatus, we were aware that we could not define the way that stem cell systems work in plain
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English, let alone in computer code, and our model (like most models) was much simpler than the
process it represented. The complexity of the natural biological system we were simulating had been
immeasurably reconfigured by the observational cuts of human, nonhuman animal, and computa-
tional agencies.
5 Intra-action, Emergence, and Observer
Emergent behavior is the phenomenon whereby a system of interacting agents, each behaving ac-
cording to a simple set of rules, seems to exhibit behavior that has not been programmed in those
simple rules. In natural biological systems, ant foraging behavior is often cited as an example of
emergent behavior. Each ant is believed to be walking around following some simple rules, but when
many ants walk around, each following the same rules, their interactions cause unexpected behaviors
to emerge that could not have easily been predicted by studying the behavior of one ant [13].
Scale and observer distance are important in observations of emergent behavior, enabling the
observer to see higher-level organization obfuscated when looking at a system close up. Just as look-
ing at the structure and growth patterns of one tree might not reveal it was part of a forest (higher
levels of organization are not determined by lower levels of organization), emergent behavior is often
said to be “greater than the sum of the parts.” Langton, writing about ALife in 1987, claimed that
“The ‘key’ concept in AL is emergent behavior. Natural life emerges from out of the organized
interactions of a great number of non-living molecules, with no global controller responsible for
the behavior of every part. Rather, every part is a behavior itself, and life is the behavior that emerges
from out of all of the local interactions among individual behaviors.” It is important to note,
however, that “[t]he field of artificial life (Alife) is replete with documented instances of emergence”
[32, p. 13], though Ronald notes that there has been debate as to the meaning of this term.
Our agential realist approach to understanding configurations of ALife sees them as emerging
through material-discursive relations. Emergence is performative and occurs through intra-actions that
include the discourses surrounding instruments used in the act of observation and of configuring. Ex-
amples are discourses about the specificities and limitations of the microscope [8] and discourses relating
to the fields of science in which these instruments are used, such as strong versus weak ALife. Using an
agent-based analogy, wemight say that discourse is part of the “environment,” influencing the behavior/
state of an agent/thing. In many ALife works, intra-actions occur between matter, most commonly
natural biological systems, which are subjected to observations and measurements via instruments such
asmicroscopes and sensors, and tomodeling using computer programs. ALife as a field has been, in part,
a study of the interplay of human bodies, human and animal bodies, humans, animals, and instruments;
at the very least, ALife has made connections between these its focus. Moreover, ALife and its often
related discipline, ABSs, has developed observer agents as a response to the observer effect—the awareness that
the act of observation has an impact on any phenomenon being observed. Observer agents are an ac-
knowledgement of the “contamination” of systems by observers, or, wemight say, the intra-action of the
observer in the natural system. Such agents are designed to address the perception that “human
observers have limited observation capabilities: some relevant aspects of interaction may escape their
attention; moreover they can be biased in collecting use data” [4, p. 43]. Intra-action disrupts the-
ories that presume that there is clear separation between the observer and the observed, that we can
draw a distinction between bodies, between, for example, human and machine.
We propose that the ABS, as it relates to ALife, might be usefully reconsidered, by adopting
Baradʼs intra-active premise that all agents emerge from the assemblage that they are an inherent
part of, and that they are not individual and rarely separate from one another or their environment
(our discussion of observational cuts addressed the rare instances where separation occurs). Accord-
ing to Bateson [5] and Varela [38], entities do not exist singularly but rather emerge through cog-
nitive sensory perception with the world and, for Bateson, through circular causal loops. This is
similar to how Barad conceptualizes knowing as a form of intra-activity; however, for Barad there
is no clear differentiation between agent and environment—in fact, her agential realist framework
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assumes that the material world (including, in our argument, combinations of matter, software, hu-
mans, and animals) is a constant process of becoming or being, and therefore agents are always emerg-
ing. Barad argues that our notions of linear causality should be replaced by entanglement, the
emergence of processes through intra-action between entities, for example, the human researcher
and nonhuman material processes. As Barad explains, “It is important to note that the ‘distinct’
agencies are only distinct in a relational, not an absolute, sense, that is, agencies are only distinct
in relation to their mutual entanglement, they do not exist as individual elements” [3, p. 33].
“Intra-action,” key to Baradʼs agential realist framework, is a neologism describing the process of
materialization, connection and emergence, and resonates with some characteristics of MASs. MASs
are commonly held to be software, composed of agents and their environment [39, 21]. However, a
broader definition of MAS allows for the agents in a MAS to be other than software. Agents might be
robots, humans, animals, or less apparently animate matter, or combinations of these. This definition
of MAS shares some characteristics with agential realism. In MASs and agent-based systems, individual
agents are usually characterized as bounded and rational. They perceive and act according to the com-
putational rules that define them, to further their own interests. MASs are useful for gaining insight
into the collective behavior of agents obeying local rules, such as cells in the body. The environment in
which an agent is situated is central to the MAS and to theories of the associated field (ABSs). In an
ABS, the environment (or model of it) is as important to the overall system being modeled as the
individual agents are. However, while MASs and ABSs assert the equal importance of agent(s) and
environment, these are commonly held to be separate, with the environment having one set of rules
by which it is determined and the agents having other rules. While the agent(s) and the environment
may constantly interact and influence one another, they are, at the same time conceptually separate.
ABS experts may dispute our interpretation of their use of the term interaction. It is certainly
Prophetʼs experience of developing the ABS of stem cells [9] that the team she worked in believed
there was no clear isolation of the cell from the environment of the human body—moreover, that
the so-called boundaried environment of the human body was only nominally separate from the larger
environment, with porous borders between human and nonhuman (e.g., orifices, skin, membranes),
resulting in blurred boundaries [12] and an ever more complex, constantly emerging and changing,
entangled system. However, it was common practice for the CELL team to temporarily think of
agents as isolated from their larger environments and/or from one another in order to develop a
clearer sense of how, for example, a particular type of cell behaved, as described in our discussion of
observational cuts. To develop their ABS, CELL referred to material discourses of then-current
research in stem cell behavior, visiting labs, attending stem cell conferences and reading peersʼ ar-
ticles to define the characteristics and behavior of individual cell types [36].
6 ABS, the Observer, and the (Meta-)observer
While it is common to many ABSs that the observations of each agent (in this case, each cell) are
modeled as part of the system, we wanted to extend this modeling of observers to take account of
those that we might term (meta-)observers—specifically, CELLʼs human scientist and programmers
who designed, wrote, and ran the program. These (meta-)observers might be described as observing
the ABS and explaining, discussing, and writing articles about it for scientific peers who are similar
(meta-)observers. This account of our practices as (meta-)observers, evident in our recorded discus-
sions, recognized that what we observed (the ABS, the formal model, the mice in the wet lab, the
slices of human and nonhuman tissue) was affected by how we made our observations. We reminded
ourselves that even though our synthesis remained scientifically useful, our practices would always
lead to a partial and flawed synthesis (because we would be writing a formal model that did not take
full account of our impact as (meta-)observers). The belief that we cannot isolate observers from the
things that they observe, from “the real world out there,” is prevalent across a wide range of
disciplines, from social science, where scientists “must consider multiple observers in a continual
co-evolving interaction with each other and with their environment” [6, p. 2], to quantum physics,
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where distinctions between observer and observed are replaced by “a symmetric notion of mutual
observers interacting with each other” [6, p. 16].
The observation of emergent behavior becomes contentious given our discussion about the im-
pact of the observer on a system; the temporary and disruptive act of the observational cut, the
expansion of the human observerʼs cognitive domain via instruments, and the way instruments that
have been designed to show particular things may leave out more than they reveal. It would seem
that “seeing” emergence is contingent on all the interferences and entanglements listed above.
Therefore, we agree with Ronald et al. that we should be wary of proposing that emergent behavior
is occurring “whenever the unexpected intrudes into the visual field of the experimenter” [32, p. 13].
In summary, that emergence, relative to any ALife model, is “the deviation of the behavior of a
physical system from an observerʼs model of it” [7].
7 The Apparatus of ALife
The agential realist discussion of representation is premised on an understanding that the act of making
representations is performative and that representations and the objects they propose to represent are
not independent of each other [2]. Barad uses the term “apparatus” to elaborate on the performativity
from which the representations of an experiment emerge. For Barad, apparatus includes both processes
that get labeled as “scientific” and processes that get labeled as “social.” An apparatus is not just the set
of instruments or mediating devices needed to perform an experiment, instead, it is the arrangement of
nonhuman and human material-discursive forces (such as formal models, algorithms, microchips, com-
putational textures, floats, objects, single-cell creatures, GPS technologies, minerals) through which par-
ticular concepts are given definition and through which particular physical properties are produced [2].
The microscope is a useful example of an arrangement of nonhuman and human material-discursive
forces: “Before cell doctrine emerged, other possibilities were explored. The ancient Greeks debated
whether the bodyʼs substance was an endlessly divisible fluid or a sum of ultimately indivisible subunits.
But when the microscopes of Theodor Schwann and Matthias Schleiden revealed cell membranes, the
debate was settled. The bodyʼs substance is not a fluid, but an indivisible box-like cell: the magnificently
successful cell doctrine was born” [36].
What is key in understanding the apparatuses of ALife is to recognize that they are boundary-
making practices, through which particular simulations of ALife with particular meanings emerge,
and that these simulations of ALife are themselves also part of the apparatus they emerge from. The
recognition that representations are performative demands that we heighten our awareness of what
is “in process” when representational techniques are used, when time-based events are represented
via still images, when three-dimensional objects are represented in two dimensions, or, in the case of
ALife, when algorithms are represented via 2D or 3D graphics or audio. In this section we discuss
with practitioners of ALife the performances of representation through intra-actions within ALife
practice. It is important to flag here that our engagement with ALife representation is not an attempt
to redraw the distinction of “life made by man and life made by nature” [22], nor do we wish to
imply that the representation of dynamic entities is merely an illusion or snapshot of life. Instead we
are proposing that ALife emerges from a “condensation of multiple practices of engagement” [2,
p. 53] distributed across humans and nonhumans, across nature and culture. We seek to understand
the effects of ALife practices as an engagement that creates real consequences, creative possibilities,
and responsibilities.
In developing ALife or multi-agent systems, the representation of entities that were dynamic as
entities that are static is a performative process that includes observational cuts such as those nec-
essary to develop the CELL simulation. Similar performative processes are at the heart of the cre-
ation of most simulations of complex natural systems—multiple representational events (multiple
observational cuts) take place to create simulations, each of which abstracts, simplifies, and distorts
the subject. The resulting simulations often affect previous understandings of the entity being
simulated; for example, the ALife simulation of stem cells in the adult human body changes our
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understanding of the natural biological system it represents. In ALife “subject and object do not
preexist as such, but emerge through intra-actions” [2, p. 214]. We can see this emergence through
intra-action in projects such as Grandroids [14], the development of an ALife system based on many
years of work across neuroscience, robotics, AI programming, and games design. In an interview for
this article, Grand gave an example of how working with matter intra-acted with his simulations of
the brain by discussing the influence of his robotics work [17] and building physical mechanisms:
One thing [building physical mechanisms] gave me, was what it took away from me,
namely, the opportunity to cheat. Once you deal with “real” matter as opposed to
“simulated” matter, when faced with real problems you canʼt get around them. […] The
constraints of the medium drive you forward. […] By building the physical thing I could
see and understand patterns and relationships that helped me to solve the problems that
I did not know how to solve. […] There were things I saw, patterns I understood from
working with electronics that had commonality with things I saw in the brain. (Steve Grand,
pers. comm.)
8 Subject and Object (E)merging through Intra-actions
Many ALife projects use code, often derived from plain English and formal models of biological sys-
tems, to drive simulation. Both the plain English and formal models are representations [9], as is the
subsequent ALife simulation. Therefore, in the case of the simulation of stem cells [9] the ALife sim-
ulation of cells is performative. In summary, ALife models of natural biological systems—including the
application of ideas and principles from biology and evolution to computer science in the areas of op-
timization, intelligent agents, and engineering—feed back to, and change our understanding of, the bi-
ological sciences. Our understanding of the natural biological systems, and the experience of biological
systems themselves, emerge through the intra-active process of making representations and through
direct material engagement with the world. Knowing and being aware of the performative nature of
these scientific practices has an influence, makes a new scientific practice, and contributes to positive
conversations between science and the humanities/arts. Theise expanded on this:
When we had the simulation running, the stem cells sent off little bursts. Thatʼs not in
the [biology] literature. It suggested that rather than being a continual flux of stem cells
from the bone marrow into the circulation, that they happen in a cyclical, burst-like
fashion. Thatʼs predicted by our model and we could do experiments that would test to
see if that is happening. If we find that they do behave like this, in burst, then we have
a new understanding of the biology, if we do not find that, then weʼd know that something
in the model needs tweaking. The first question is not, is the model wrong? […] The first
question is, is there something in the biological system that we have not observed before,
because we did not look for it? Our model suggested new things to look for. (Neil Theise,
pers. comm.)
Reconsidering our approach to the way we make representations is one of the desires driving the
new versions of TechnoSphere, currently in development. TechnoSphereʼs Mark Hurry notes that the
1990s version consisted of an ALife system that was closed to the human user, who had no control
over a creature they had created:
Interaction with the original version was about creating the creature and then receiving
email updates when the creature did something interesting, or going online and seeing
what the creature stats were, very much a passive observer type experience. The first 3D
version added the ability to follow the creature around a virtual world and observe its
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interactions with the environment and other creatures, but no interaction or further control
by the user. (Mark Hurry, pers. comm.)
By contrast, the contemporary TechnoSphere application takes accounts of the entanglements of the
real environment, computational system, and human and ALife creatures. The situated act of ob-
serving the creature, by activating GPS in the app, has immediate impact on the creature being ob-
served, as GPS-related data becomes part of their behavioral controllers.
Presenting the 3D creature in its real world environment, [by] incorporating the userʼs
GPS position as way of locating the creature in the real world […] could lead to
creatures interacting with specific places […] Data collected from other on-board sensors
such as light meters, could allow a creatureʼs visual acuity to be affected by differing light
levels from day to night, but also from lit to unlit locations. (Mark Hurry, pers. comm.)
9 Conclusion
Throughout the article we have made a diffractive reading of Baradʼs agential realism, through the
practices of ALife and ABSs. Through translations between terms such as ALifeʼs “agent” and “agen-
tial realism,” ALifeʼs emphasis on the boundaries between agents come to matter [2, p. 210]. In the
transformation of ALife concepts of interaction to Baradian theories of intra-action we recognize the
ongoing entanglement of the observer and the observed. Diffractively reading Baradʼs understand-
ings of observational cuts against ALife practices reveals their entangled intra-actions.
The authors now have a new awareness of the formation of ALife apparatuses, including our way of
thinking, our conceptual models. In projects like CELL, we accept that ALife code is not separate from
cellular systems, but rather our understandings and models themselves emerge, are emergent, when we
as humans intra-act with ALife apparatuses. We should be mindful of the performativity of ALife ap-
paratuses, the oscillation between inclusion and exclusion that material-discursive structures offer. How-
ever, we should also be open to the potential that apparatuses have to ‘reveal’. If we recognize that an
apparatus is performative, we can be open to the generative potential of new ALife, or new experiences
of known ALife, in a different way. Allowing for our own agency (or, as ALife would suggest, allowing
for the influence of our role as observers of the diffraction) caused us to shift from describing our
inquiry as diffractive reading to what we term “diffractive practice.” “Diffractive practice” reminds us
that we are not simply observers or readers, but artist practitioners; it prompts us to make close readings
of our practices as artists, as well as the practices of the biological and computer scientists that we work
alongside. Often we each become so acclimatized to the norms of our own practices and processes that
we become blind to them. The perspectives, experiences, contacts, and discourses that have formed the
artistʼs apparatus are qualitatively different from those of an experienced cell biologist or mathematician,
each of whom is familiar with their everyday apparatus. We believe it is possible (but not automatic) that
the diffractive practices of collaborative teams composed of members from different disciplines can
expose blind spots via the questioning of one anotherʼs necessarily unfamiliar processes and discourses,
in other words, one anotherʼs apparatuses. We hypothesize that close readings of diffractive practice-as-
it-happens will further highlight the interferences between our patterns of practice.
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